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Abstract
To this day, terrorism persists as a worldwide threat, as exemplified by the ongoing lethal attacks
perpetrated by ISIS in Iraq, Syria, Al Qaeda in Yemen, and Boko Haram in Nigeria. In response,
states deploy various counterterrorism policies, the costs of which could be reduced through efficient
preventive measures. Statistical models able to account for complex spatio-temporal dependencies
have not yet been applied, despite their potential for providing guidance to explain and prevent
terrorism. In an effort to address this shortcoming, we employ hierarchical models in a Bayesian
context, where the spatial random field is represented by a stochastic partial differential equation.
Our results confirm the contagious nature of the lethality of terrorism and the number of lethal
terrorist attacks in both space and time. Moreover, the frequency of lethal attacks tends to be higher
in more economically developed areas, close to large cities, and within democratic countries. In
contrast, attacks are more likely to be lethal far away from large cities, at higher altitudes, in less
economically developed areas, and in locations with higher ethnic diversity. We argue that, on a
local scale, the lethality of terrorism and the frequency of lethal attacks are driven by antagonistic
mechanisms.
Keywords— Bayesian hierarchical models; GMRF; space-time models; SPDE; terrorism
1 Introduction
Nowadays, terrorism represents a worldwide threat, illustrated by the ongoing deadly attacks perpetrated
by the Islamic State (also called ISIS, ISIL, or Daesh) in Iraq and Syria, Boko Haram in Nigeria, and the
al-Nusra Front (also called Jabhat al-Nusra) in Syria for example. In response to this threat, states may
use a combination of counterterrorism policies, which include the use of criminal justice, military power,
intelligence, psychological operations, and preventives measures (Crelinsten, 2009, p. 45). In particular,
following the tragic terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 (9/11) in New York, states have tended to
increase their spending to counter terrorism. From 2001 to 2008, the expenditure of worldwide homeland
security increased by US$ 70 billion (NATO, 2008). In the US alone, the 2013 federal budget devoted to
combat terrorism reached around US$ 17.2 billion (The Washington Post, 2013).
Theoretical work and empirical studies at country-level pointed out that the causes of terrorism
are complex and multidimensional and include economic, political, social, cultural, and environmental
factors (Brynjar and Skjølberg, 2000; Richardson, 2006, p. 60; Gassebner and Luechinger, 2011; Krieger
and Meierrieks, 2011; Hsiang et al., 2013). Moreover, the relationship between specific factors and
terrorism is often not straightforward. For example, Hoffman (2006, p. 194) described the role of media
in covering terrorism as a “double-edged sword”: publicity promotes terrorist groups, which facilitates
the recruitment of new members and strengthens the cohesion of groups, but in turn, encourages society
to marshal resources to combat terrorism (Rapoport, 1996). At the individual level, the actions and
beliefs of each member of terrorist groups are important drivers of terrorism as well (Crenshaw, 1983,
p.29; Wilkinson, 1990, p.141; Richardson, 2006, pp.92-93).
From a modelling perspective, terrorism is therefore not an entirely random process. Similar to
contagious diseases (Jacquez, 1996; Mantel, 1967; Loftin, 1986) or seismic activity (Mohler et al., 2011;
Crough and Jurdy, 1980; Courtillot et al., 2003), terrorist events are rarely homogeneously distributed
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in space. In contrast, they tend to exhibit high concentration levels in specific locations (so-called “hot-
spots”) (LaFree et al., 2009, 2010, 2012; Nacos, 2010; Steen et al., 2006; Piegorsch et al., 2007), and can
spread from one location to another (Midlarsky et al., 1980; Neumayer and Plu¨mper, 2010; Mohler, 2013),
as in a “diffusion” processes (Cohen and Tita, 1999; Forsberg, 2014). Moreover, the activity of terrorism
may also vary over time and often exhibits temporally clustered patterns like crime or insurgencies
(Anselin et al., 2000; Eck et al., 2005; Zammit-Mangion et al., 2012).
Despite successful applications of space-time Bayesian models in similar fields of research, such as
crime and conflict (Zammit-Mangion et al., 2012, 2013; Mohler, 2013; Lewis et al., 2012; Rodrigues et al.,
2010), these models have not yet been applied in terrorism research. Most empirical research in terrorism
has focused on its temporal dimension (Hamilton and Hamilton, 1983; Porter and White, 2012; Brandt
and Sandler, 2012; Barros, 2003; Enders and Sandler, 1999; Suleman, 2012; Bilal et al., 2012; Holden,
1986; Enders and Sandler, 1993; Enders et al., 2011; Enders and Sandler, 2005, 2000; Weimann and
Brosius, 1988; Raghavan et al., 2013), or has considered purely spatial models only (Braithwaite and Li,
2007; Savitch and Ardashev, 2001; Brown et al., 2004). Moreover, studies that have explicitly integrated
both space and time dimensions have been carried out at country or higher level of analysis (LaFree et al.,
2010; Midlarsky et al., 1980; Neumayer and Plu¨mper, 2010; Enders and Sandler, 2006; Gao et al., 2013),
or at subnational level of analysis but within specific study areas (LaFree et al., 2012; Behlendorf et al.,
2012; Nunn, 2007; Piegorsch et al., 2007; O¨cal and Yildirim, 2010; Medina et al., 2011; Siebeneck et al.,
2009; Mohler, 2013).
As a result, scholars have failed to systematically capture the fine-scale spatial dynamics of terrorism.
Local drivers of terrorism have not been identified and their effects have not been systematically assessed.
In an effort to address this shortcoming, we use space-time Bayesian models based on the stochastic partial
differential equation (SPDE) approach implemented through computationally efficient integrated nested
Laplace approximation (INLA) techniques (Rue et al., 2009; Lindgren et al., 2011). Our approach, which
integrates spatially explicit covariates and data on terrorist events, allows to capture local-scale spatial
patterns of both the capacity of terrorist attack of causing death and the number of lethal attacks, which
will respectively further refer to the lethality of terrorism and the frequency of lethal attacks.
Moreover, this study provides a measure of the effects of local-scale factors involved in the spatial and
temporal variations of the lethality and the frequency of terrorism across the world from 2002 to 2013.
The results of this study could benefit policy makers needing a systematic and accurate assessment of
the security threat posed by deadly terrorist activity at subnational level. The paper is structured as
follows. Section 2 briefly introduces the data used for the analysis. The statistical models are described in
Section 3 and the results are provided in Section 4. Finally, conclusions and recommendations for further
research are discussed in Section 5. The computer code used in this paper is available in supplementary
material.
2 Data Selection
2.1 Terrorism database
In order to build valuable, empirically-based models, it is crucial to base an analysis on a data source that
is as suitable as possible for a given study (Zammit-Mangion et al., 2012). There are currently four major
databases that provide data on worldwide non-state terrorism (terrorism perpetrated by non-state actors):
the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), the RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents (RDWTI),
the International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events (ITERATE), and the Global Database of
Events, Language, and Tone (GDELT). ITERATE has been extensively referred to in terrorism research
(Enders et al., 2011), however, events are geolocalised at the country level, which does not allow to capture
subnational processes. GDELT is not suitable for our purpose since it does not provide the number of
fatalities or information on lethality of terrorism. Equally problematic, GDELT uses a fully automated
coding system based on Conflict and Mediation Event Observations (CAMEO) (for further information
on CAMEO, see: http://data.gdeltproject.org/documentation/CAMEO.Manual.1.1b3.pdf), which
may lead to a strong geographic bias, as mentioned by Hammond and Weidmann (2014).
Hence, RDWTI and GTD are the only potentially relevant databases that provide geolocalised ter-
rorist events across the world. Drawing from Sheehan’s approach to compare terrorism databases (2012),
we defined four criteria to select the one which will be used in our study: conceptual clarity, scope, coding
method, and spatial accuracy. Given that the concept of terrorism is intrinsically ambiguous and being
debated to this day (Beck and Miner, 2013), conceptual clarity in both the definition of terrorist events
and the coding method used to gather data are crucial. In both GTD and RDWTI, the definition used to
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class an event as terrorism is clearly specified. The coding method of GTD appears more rigorous, since
events are gathered from numerous sources and articles (more than 4,000,000 news articles and 25,000
news sources used from 1998 and 2013 (GTD, 2014)), which limits the risk of bias resulting from incon-
sistent ways of reporting the number of fatalities in different media (Drakos and Gofas, 2006; Drakos,
2007). The data collection methodology used in RDWTI is less reliable since some events are gathered
from two sources only. Moreover, the scope of GTD is wider than RDWTI. GTD is updated annually
and includes more than 140,000 events from 1970 until 2014, whereas RDWTI was not updated after
2009 and includes 40,129 events from 1969 to 2009 only (START, 2014; RAND, 2011).
Since this research investigates fine-scale spatial phenomena, we put particular emphasis on the spatial
accuracy of the data. GTD is the only database that includes a variable assigning the spatial accuracy
of each individual observation. Spatial accuracy is represented by an ordinal variable called specificity,
with 5 possible levels of spatial accuracy (for further information on specificity, see GTD codebook:
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/downloads/Codebook.pdf)(GTD, 2014). Based on all these consid-
erations we have chosen GTD as the appropriate data source for this study. The dataset contains 35,917
spatially accurate events (events corresponding to the highest level of spatial accuracy, with specificity=1),
occurring between 2002 and 2013.
2.2 Covariates
Potentially relevant covariates were identified based on a thorough review of 43 studies carried out at
country level by Gassebner and Luechinger (2011), which highlighted the main explanatory factors among
65 potential determinants of terrorism. Among those factors, we consider covariates that satisfy two es-
sential characteristics: (i) potential relationship with the lethality of terrorism and/or the frequency of
lethal terrorist attacks; (ii) availability at high spatial resolution, in order to model fine-scale spatial
dynamics of terrorism worldwide. Seven spatial and space-time covariates met these criteria and their
potential association with terrorism is described in more detail below: satellite night light (lum), popu-
lation density (pop), political regime (pol), altitude (alt), slope (slo), travel time to the nearest large city
(tt), and distance to the nearest national border (distb).
First, we assess the role of economic factors on the lethality of terrorism, whose possible effects are still
under debate. Most country-level empirical studies have not provided any evidence of a linear relationship
between terrorism and gross domestic product (GDP) (Abadie, 2006; Drakos and Gofas, 2006; Gassebner
and Luechinger, 2011; Krueger and Laitin, 2008; Krueger and Maleckova, 2003; Piazza, 2006), without
excluding possible non-linear relationship (Enders and Hoover, 2012). Case studies focused in the Middle
East, including Israel and Palestine, showed that GDP is not significantly related to the number of suicide
terrorist attacks (Berman and Laitin, 2008). Few studies, however, found that countries with high per
capita GDP may encounter high levels of terrorist attacks (Tavares, 2004; Blomberg and Rosendorff,
2009). In line with the subnational nature of our study, we use NOAA satellite lights at night (Version
4 DMSP-OLS) as a covariate, which provides information about worldwide human activities on a yearly
basis and at a high spatial resolution (30 arc-second grid) (Chen and Nordhaus, 2011; NOAA, 2014).
This variable has been used as a proxy for socio-economic development measures such as per capita
GDP estimation (Sutton and Costanza, 2002; Sutton et al., 2007; Elvidge et al., 2007; Ebener et al.,
2005; Henderson et al., 2009). Note that three versions are available: Average Visible, Stable Lights,
and Cloud Free Coverages. We use Stable Lights, which filter background noise and identify zero-cloud
free observations (NOAA, 2014). In order to compare values of different years, we calibrate the data
according to the procedure described in Elvidge et al. (2013, Chap.6).
Second, we assess the role of demography. Cities may provide more human mobility, anonymity,
audiences and a larger recruitment pool in comparison to rural areas (Crenshaw, 1990, p. 115; Savitch
and Ardashev, 2001). Large cities, in particular, offer a high degree of anonymity for terrorists to operate
(Laqueur, 1999, p. 41). More specifically, densely populated areas appear vulnerable and are usually more
prone to terrorism than sparsely populated areas (Ross, 1993; Savitch and Ardashev, 2001; Crenshaw,
1981; Swanstrom, 2002; Coaffee, 2010). In addition, locations that shelter high-value symbolic targets
(buildings or installations), human targets (government officials, mayors, etc.), and public targets (public
transports, shopping centres, cinemas, sport arenas, public venues, etc.) are particularly vulnerable to
suicide terrorism (Hoffman, 2006, p. 167). Therefore, we use the Gridded Population of the World (v3),
which provides population density on a yearly basis and at high-resolution (2.5 arc-minute grid) (CIESIN,
2005). Moreover, terrorists usually require free and rapid movement by rail or road in order to move from
and to target points (Heyman and Mickolus, 1980; Wilkinson, 1979, p. 189). We compute the travel time
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from each terrorist event to the nearest large city (more than 50,000 inhabitants) based on Travel Time
to Major Cities (Nelson, 2008) at a high spatial resolution (30 arc-second grid).
Third, we assess the role of geographical variables: altitude, surface topography (slope), and distance
to the nearest national border. Although the relationship between altitude, slope, and the lethality of
terrorism is not straightforward, both variables provide an indication of the type of the geographical
location, which could be a determining factor for terrorists regarding their choice of target (Ross, 1993).
Moreover, Nemeth et al. (2014) suggested that distance to the nearest national border and altitude or
slope might have an impact on terrorist activity. We extract both variables from NOAA Global Relief
Model (ETOPO1), which provides altitude values at high spatial resolution (1 arc-minute grid) (Amante
and Eakins, 2009).
Fourth, we assess the role of democracy. Under-reporting biases may occur especially in non-democratic
countries where the press is often not free (Drakos and Gofas, 2006; Drakos, 2007). We extract the
level of democracy from Polity IV Project, Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2014
(Polity IV) (Marshall et al., 2014). Polity IV informs about the level of freedom of press, and captures the
level of democracy from −10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy) for most indepen-
dent countries from 1800 to 2014. Therefore, it has been commonly referred as proxy for measuring the
type of regime or the extent of constraints in democratic institutions (Gleditsch, 2007; Li, 2005; Piazza,
2006).
Fifth, we assess the role of ethnicity. We compute the number of different ethnic groups from the
“Georeferencing of ethnic groups” (GREG) database. GREG is the digitalised version of the Soviet
Atlas Narodov Mira (ANM), and counts 1,276 ethnic groups around the world (Weidmann et al., 2010).
Although ANM includes information dating back to the 1960s, it is still regarded as a reliable source
for ethnicity across the world (Bhavnani and Choi, 2012; Morelli and Rohner, 2014). Although ethnic
diversity does not necessarily lead to violence per se (Silberfein, 2003, p. 68), studies at country-level
suggest that more terrorism may occur in ethnically fragmented societies (Kurrild-Klitgaard et al., 2006;
Gassebner and Luechinger, 2011), in countries with strong ethnic tensions, or may originate from ethnic
conflicts in other regions (Basuchoudhary and Shughart, 2010).
3 Modelling the Spatial Dynamics of Terrorism
3.1 SPDE Framework
We assume that both the lethality of terrorism and the frequency of lethal terrorist attacks are continuous
phenomena with Gaussian properties, which exhibit dependencies in both space and time. We suggest
modelling their spatial dynamics through the SPDE approach introduced by Lindgren et al. (2011).
The solution of the SPDE given in equation (1) is a Gaussian field (GF) (Lindgren et al., 2011), whose
approximation represents a Gaussian Markov random field (GMRF) used herein to model the spatio-
temporal dependencies inherent in the data. The linear SPDE can be formulated as:
(κ2 −∆)α/2(τζ(s)) = W(s), s ∈ D , (1)
with the Laplacian ∆, smoothness parameter α = λ + 1 (for two-dimensional processes), scale param-
eter κ > 0, variance parameter τ , domain D, and Gaussian spatial white noise W(s) (Blangiardo and
Cameletti, 2015, chap 6). The stationary solution of equation (1) is the GF (ζ(s)) with Mate´rn covariance
function:
Cov(ζ(si), ζ(sj)) = σ
2
ζ
1
Γ(λ)2λ−1
(
κ ‖si − sj‖
)λ
Kλ
(
κ ‖si − sj‖
)
, (2)
where ‖si − sj‖ is the Euclidean distance between two locations, σ2ζ is the marginal variance, and
Kλ is the modified Bessel function of the second kind and order λ > 0. The distance from which
the spatial correlation becomes negligible (for λ > 0.5) is given by the range r (vertical dotted line in
figure 1, centre and right), which can be empirically derived from the scale parameter r =
√
8λ/κ to be
estimated. The GF (ζ(s)) is approximated as a GMRF (ζ˜(s)) through a finite element method using basis
functions defined on a Constrained Refined Delaunay Triangulation (mesh) over the earth, modelled as a
sphere (figure 1, left) (Lindgren et al., 2011). Here, we use a three-stage Bayesian hierarchical modelling
framework (Banerjee et al., 2014) to model the lethality of terrorism as a Bernoulli process (Section 3.2)
and the frequency of lethal terrorist attacks as a Poisson process (Section 3.3).
4
3.2 Bernoulli Model
While terrorist attacks are inherently discrete in space (terrorist attacks occur at specific locations on
earth), we consider their lethality Y as a continuous phenomenon (in the sense of geostatistics (Cressie,
1991)), which is observed at s locations (attacks) over the surface of the earth S2 at time t ∈ R. The
lethality is assumed to be the realisations of a continuously indexed space-time process Y (s, t) ≡ {y(s, t) :
(s, t) ∈ D ⊆ S2 ×R}, from which inference can be made about the process at any desired locations in D
(Cameletti et al., 2013). Hence, our hierarchical modelling framework is composed of three levels:
y(si, t)|θ, ζ˜ ∼ Bernoulli(pi(si, t)) (3a)
logit(pi(si, t))|θ = η(si, t)|θ = β0 + z(si, t)β + ζ˜(si, t) + (si, t) (3b)
θ = p(θ), (3c)
where the lethality y(si, t) is a dichotomous variable that takes the value 1 if the attack generated one
or more deaths, and 0 if not (equation (3a)). The parameters to be estimated are θ = {β0,β, σ2 , τ, κ, ρ},
which include the precision of the GMRF τ = 1/σ2
ζ˜
, the scale parameter κ > 0 of its Mate´rn covari-
ance function (equation (2)), and the temporal autocorrelation parameter |ρ| < 1 (described in more
detail below) (equations (3a), (3b), (3c)). The conditional distribution of the linear predictor η(si, t) =
logit(pi(si, t)), given the parameters θ (equation (3b)), includes Gaussian white noise (si, t) ∼ N(0, σ2 ),
with measurement error variance σ2 , a vector of k covariates z(si, t) = (z1(si, t), . . . , zk(si, t)) with
coefficient vector β = (β1, . . . , βk)
′ and the GMRF ζ˜(si, t).
Based on GTD (GTD, 2014), we extract the lethality of 35,917 accurately geolocalised terrorist
attacks that occurred from year t = 2002 to t = 2013 in i = 1, . . . , 35, 917 space-time locations si.
In equation (3a), we assume that y(si, t) follows a conditional Bernoulli distribution with probability
pi(si, t) of observing a lethal event and 1 − pi(si, t) of observing a non-lethal event, given the GMRF ζ˜
and parameters θ.
In order to minimise the complexity of the models, and consequently, reduce the computing time
required to fit them, we assume a separable space-time covariance (Blangiardo and Cameletti, 2015, chap
7). Hence, the GMRF ζ˜(si, t) follows a first-order autoregressive process AR(1): ζ˜(si, t) = ρ ζ˜(si, t −
1) + ψ(si, t), time independent zero-mean Gaussian field ψ(si, t) with Cov(ζ˜(si, t), ζ˜(sj , u)) = 0 if t 6= u,
and Cov(ζ˜(si), ζ˜(sj)) if t = u,∀t, u ∈ {2002, . . . , 2013}.
Prior distributions (equation (3c)) are set for the parameters to be estimated (θ = {β0,β, σ2 , τ, κ, ρ}),
which includes GMRF’s precision τ = 1/σ2
ζ˜
, scale parameter κ > 0 of its Mate´rn covariance function
(equation (2)), and temporal autocorrelation parameter |ρ| < 1. We use the default option for the
stationary model in R-INLA as priors on τ and κ through prior distribution on log(τ), log(κ) ∼ N(0, 1),
so that log(κ(s)) = log(κ) and log(τ(s)) = log(τ). For prior sensitivity analysis, we compare our results
with alternative priors on τ and κ, which is further discussed in Section 4.
The modelling approach is used to identify regions of abnormally high values (hot-spots) of the lethal-
ity of terrorism from the estimated posterior distribution of the probability of lethal attack interpolated
in all space-time locations s, t ∈ D. For each year (t = 2002, . . . , 2013), we identify locations where the
95% credible interval (CI) for the probability of lethal attack is above a threshold  (0 <  < 1):
LCI95%pi(s, t) > , s, t ∈ D, (4)
where LCI95% is the lower bound of the 95% CI, pi(s, t) is the probability of the attack(s) to be lethal
in location s and time t,  is the threshold, and D is the domain. We define a hot-spot as the groups
of contiguous locations s that satisfy equation (4). Here we use  = 0.5, which means that we define
hot-spot areas where it is more likely to have lethal attacks than non-lethal attacks. In other terms, we
are 95% confident that the true value of the probability of lethal attack is greater than 50%.
3.3 Poisson Model
In addition to modelling the lethality of terrorist attacks, one might identify locations that are more likely
to encounter a higher number of lethal attacks over a year, which we further refer as the frequency of
lethal terrorist attacks. The identification of such locations could be crucial for city planners, emergency
managers, insurance companies, and property administrators for example, since this information could
be used to better allocate resources used to prevent and counter terrorism (Piegorsch et al., 2007; Nunn,
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2007). As in equation (3), we use a three-stage Bayesian hierarchical modelling framework (Banerjee
et al., 2014):
y(si, t)|θ, ζ˜ ∼ Poisson(µ(si, t)) (5a)
log(µ(si, t))|θ = η(si, t)|θ = β0 + z(si, t)β + ζ˜(si, t) + (si, t) (5b)
θ = p(θ). (5c)
Based on GTD (2014), we consider the observed number of lethal attacks (y(si, t) in equation (5a))
that occurred in a period of 12 years (t = 2002, . . . , 2013) in 6,386 locations si within a 0.5
◦ radius
of cities’ centroids. Since we model a “count” variable (y(si, t)), it is convenient to aggregate events
that occurred in very close locations within identical municipality areas for example. This has resulted
in spatial aggregation reducing the number of observations from 35,917 (equation (3)) to 6,386 (equa-
tion (5)). Moreover, we assume that y(si, t) follows a Poisson distribution with parameter µ(si, t), with
log(µ(si, t)) = η(si, t) and expected value E(y(si, t)) = µ(si, t).
Equation (5b) is structurally identical to equation (3b). As in the Bernoulli model (Section 3.2), we
use the default option for the stationary model in R-INLA as priors on τ and κ through prior distribution
on log(τ), log(κ) ∼ N(0, 1), so that log(κ(s)) = log(κ) and log(τ(s)) = log(τ). To assess prior sensitivity,
we compare our results with elicited priors on κ and τ , which is further discussed in Section 4. As in
the Bernoulli model, we identify hot-spots of high number of lethal attacks by replacing the posterior
probability pi (equation (4)) with the posterior expected number of lethal events µ(si, t) (equation (5a)).
We set  = 5, which highlights cells with an expected number of lethal attacks greater than 5 (Figure 4).
This threshold corresponds to the 90th percentile of the number of lethal attacks observed in the sample
(n = 6, 386).
4 Results
4.1 Explaining the Spatial Dynamics of Terrorism
We use INLA as an accurate and computationally efficient model fitting method (Rue et al., 2009; Held
et al., 2010; Simpson et al., 2016). With a 12-core Linux machine (99 GB of RAM), R-INLA requires
approximately 7 days to fit each model. It is likely that fitting a similar model with MCMC methods
would take too long to be practically feasible. We select one Bernoulli (among models with 0, 1, 2, 3,
4, and 5 covariates) and one Poisson model (among models with 3, 4, and 5 covariates), which exhibit
the lowest Deviance Information Criteria (DIC) and Watanabe-Akaike information criterion (WAIC)
(Watanabe, 2010; Spiegelhalter et al., 2002). The selected Bernoulli model includes k = 4 standardised
covariates with corresponding coefficients: satellite night light (βlum), altitude (βalt), ethnicity (βgreg),
and travel time to the nearest large city (βtt). The selected Poisson model includes k = 5 standardised
covariates with corresponding coefficients: satellite night light (βlum), altitude (βalt), democracy level
(βpol), population density (βpop), and travel time to the nearest large city (βtt).
The Bernoulli model (table 1, columns “Bernoulli”) suggests that terrorist attacks are more likely
to be lethal far away from large cities, in higher altitude, in locations with higher ethnic diversity
(CI95% βtt, βgreg, βalt > 0), and are less likely in areas with higher human activity (CI95% βlum < 0). As
an illustration, we compare the effect of an hypothetical 50% increase in the mean of luminosity (lum) on
the probability of encountering lethal attacks (pi). Since the covariates β are standardised, particular care
should be taken to estimate such effect. Recall that NOAA satellite data on lights at night provide non-
standardised values of luminosity from 0 (min) to 63 (max) (NOAA, 2014). Based on 35,917 observations
used in the Bernoulli model, a 50% increase in the mean of luminosity corresponds to an increase from 34.3
to 51.5, or equivalently, from 0 to 0.73 on a standardised scale. In the benchmark scenario, all predictors,
including lum and other covariates tt, greg, alt, and the GMRF (ξ˜) are held equal to 0. Hence, the linear
predictor η (equation (3b)) equals 0 and pi = 1/(1 + exp (−η)) = 1/(1 + 1) = 0.5. In the scenario includ-
ing a 50% increase in the mean of luminosity, lum = 0.73, η = βlum × lum = −0.11 × 0.73 = −0.0803,
given that βlum = −0.11 (table 1, columns “Bernoulli”). Hence, pi = 1/(1 + exp−(−0.0803)) ∼= 0.48.
As a result, an increase in the mean of luminosity by 50% decreases the probability of lethal attacks by
approximately 2%.
In contrast, the Poisson model (table 1, columns “Poisson”) suggests that more economically devel-
oped areas, and locations with higher democratic levels (CI95% βlum, βpol > 0) and close to large cities
(CI95% βtt < 0) are more likely to encounter a higher number of lethal attacks. However, we did not
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find a significant relationship between altitude, population density, and the number of lethal attacks
(0 ∈ CI95% βalt, βpop). The interpretation of these results is discussed in further detail in Section 5. Note
that the results from the two models cannot be directly compared since they are based on a different
number of observations, set of covariates, and spatial aggregation.
As with the Bernoulli model, we analyse the effect of a 50% increase in the mean of luminosity on the
expected number of lethal attacks (µ) estimated by the Poisson model, with all predictors, including lum
and the other covariates tt, alt, pol, pop, and the GMRF (ξ˜) held equal to 0. In the benchmark scenario,
η (equation (5b)) equals to 0, therefore the expected number of lethal attacks µ = exp (0) = 1. Based on
6,386 observations used in the Poisson model, a 50% increase in the mean of luminosity corresponds to an
increase from 7.45 to 11.2, or equivalently, from 0 to 0.25 in the corresponding standardised scale. Hence,
η = (βlum×lum), with βlum = 0.51 (table 1, columns “Poisson”). We obtain µ = exp (0.51× 0.25) ∼= 1.14.
Therefore, an increase in the mean of luminosity by 50% increases the expected number of lethal attacks
by approximately 0.14.
Bernoulli (n=35,917) Poisson (n=6,386)
mean sd 95% CI mean sd 95% CI
Cov. (β)
β0 -0.58 0.13 (-0.83; -0.32) -1.37 0.09 (-1.55; -1.19)
βlum -0.11 0.02 (-0.15; -0.06) 0.51 0.02 ( 0.47; 0.54)
βtt 0.06 0.02 ( 0.02; 0.09) -0.38 0.02 (-0.42; -0.34)
βgreg 0.04 0.02 (0.003; 0.08)
βalt 0.08 0.03 ( 0.03; 0.13) 0.03 0.02 (-0.001; 0.07)
βpol 0.42 0.01 ( 0.39; 0.45)
βpop 0.009 0.02 (-0.03; 0.04)
GMRF (ζ˜)
ρ (AR1) 0.91 0.01 (0.88; 0.91) 0.91 0.07 (0.90; 0.93)
κ 23.3 (19.4; 27.6) 76.0 (66.9; 85.8)
σ2
ζ˜
2.27 (1.83; 2.73) 4.61 (4.11; 5.13)
r [km] 779 (643; 915) 238 (208; 267)
Table 1: Posterior mean, standard deviation, and 95% credible intervals (CI) of the intercept β0, the
coefficients of the standardised covariates (β), the temporal (ρ), and the spatial parameters of the GMRF
ζ˜ (κ, σ2
ζ˜
, and range r) estimated in the Bernoulli (n = 35, 917) and Poisson (n = 6, 386) models. Note
that the 95% CI associated with the spatial parameters correspond to 95% highest probability density
intervals.
4.2 Quantifying the Uncertainty
As a further step, we explore the spatial dynamics of both the lethality of terrorism and the frequency of
lethal terrorist attacks by visualising relevant parameters that vary in both space and time. For this pur-
pose, the posterior mean (ζ˜(s, t)) and standard deviation (σζ˜(s, t)) of the GMRF provide valuable insight
into the understanding of the spatial dynamics of terrorism and more particularly, of the uncertainty in
the predictions of both the lethality of terrorism (pi(s, t)) and the frequency of lethal terrorist attacks
(µ(s, t)). High values of σζ˜(s, t) signify that there is high uncertainty with regard to the estimated values
of ζ˜(s, t), mainly due to the scarcity or absence of data. Some areas have not encountered any terrorist
attack during the entire period and therefore exhibit persistently high values, such as Siberia, the Amazo-
nian region, Central Australia, or Greenland (figures 2b, 2e, 3b, 3e). In contrast, several regions in South
America, Africa, Golf Peninsula, India and Pakistan show an increase of the lethality of terrorism and
the frequency of lethal terrorist attacks (figures 2c, 2f, 3c, 3f) between 2002 and 2013 accompanied by
lower values of σζ˜(s, t). As expected, uncertainty is much lower in regions which encounter more attacks.
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4.3 Hot-spots
The identification of hot-spots of lethality and frequency of lethal attacks is highly valuable since it
highlights areas more vulnerable to terrorism, which call for increased vigilance. For example, one might
observe important changes in both the lethality of terrorism (figures 4a, 4b) and frequency of lethal
terrorist attacks (figures 4c, 4d) in various locations in Iraq from 2002 to 2013. Both the number and the
size of hot-spots in Iraq increased from 2002 to 2013, which reflects the intensification of terrorist activity
that followed the invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Operation Iraqi Freedom) carried out by the coalition. In 2002
already, the CIA director George Tenet and the US National Intelligence Council warned the US and
UK government that radicalization and terrorism activity will increase in Iraq and outside its borders
due to the invasion of Iraq. This was later confirmed by Britain’s Royal Institute of International Affairs
(Chatham House) shortly after the 2005 London bombings, and also by various reports from Israeli think
tank, Saudi and French Intelligence in particular (Chomsky, 2006, pp. 18-21).
Similarly, we observe an increase in both the lethality of terrorism and frequency of lethal terrorist
attacks in some regions in Afghanistan. Indeed, Afghanistan has been the theatre of numerous terrorist
attacks since the US-led invasion in 2001 following 9/11. From 2003 to 2013, 3,539 terrorist attacks
occurred mainly in the centre-east of Afghanistan, including the cities of Kabul, Jalalabad, Khogyani,
and Sabari. From 2003 to 2013, 243 events (of which 157 were lethal) occurred in Kabul only. Most
of these attacks were perpetrated by the Taliban. Even after the Taliban’s withdrawal from Kabul in
November 2001, lethal terrorist attacks did not cease in the city and within the country (Aljazeera, 2009).
Indeed, highly lethal suicide bombings intensified from 2006 to 2013 (and further) (GTD, 2014).
4.4 Robustness tests
The present study used the default Gaussian priors (multivariate Normal) provided by R-INLA for the
parameters of the GMRF (κ and τ). As a robustness test, we run a prior sensitivity analysis for both
the Bernoulli and the Poisson model changing the prior distribution of κ and τ . In practice, we changed
the prior distribution of the variance of the GMRF σ2
ζ˜
and range r, whose quantities can be more easily
interpreted, and therefore attributed a prior distribution. For both, the Binomial and the Poisson model,
we set σ2
ζ˜
= 50, which corresponds to a relatively large variance of the GMRF, since we assume that the
spatial structure might exhibit considerable variation among areas that encountered a high number of
lethal terrorist attacks (e.g. some locations in Iraq, Pakistan or Afghanistan) and those that did encounter
only a few or none (e.g. some locations in Portugal, Brazil or Alaska).
Assuming that the lethality of terrorist attacks can spread over relatively large areas (e.g. through
demonstration and imitation processes promoted by the media (Brosius and Weimann, 1991; Enders
et al., 1992; Brynjar and Skjølberg, 2000)), we set r = 500 [km] in the Binomial model. In contrast,
we set r = 100 [km] in the Poisson model, since we believe that the number of lethal attacks is very
specific to the characteristics related to the close neighbourhood in which they occur. The number of
potential high-value, symbolic targets, human and public targets (see Section 2.2) can vary widely across
distant areas. For example, one might reasonably assume that Baghdad shares important similarities with
close Iraqi cities such as Abu-Grahib or Al-Fallujah (approximately 30-60 km from Baghdad). However,
distant cities such as Al-Kasrah, Iraq (approximately 300 km from Baghdad) might exhibit important
different characteristics, and therefore numbers of lethal attacks that are almost independent of the levels
observed in Baghdad. Hence, we compute the corresponding κ and τ (Lindgren and Rue, 2015; Bivand
et al., 2015), κ =
√
8
r and τ =
1√
4piκσ
(Lindgren et al., 2011).
The mean and the credible intervals of the estimated coefficients β and the parameters of the GMRF
(τ , r) are illustrated for both Bernoulli (Figure 5, left) and Poisson models (Figure 5, right), where default
priors ( ) and modified priors ( ) are specified. The parameters of the GMRF (τ , r) are not affected by
a change in prior in both Bernoulli and Poisson models, albeit the estimated value of the mean of τ is less
robust in the Poisson model. In the Bernoulli model, both mean and credible intervals of all parameters
are almost identical between the default and modified priors. In the Poisson models, the direction of the
effect of the estimated coefficients is not affected by changes in prior, albeit the estimated values of the
mean of the parameters (especially βtt and βlum) are less robust. A higher sensitivity to change in prior
is expected in the Poisson model since its number of observations (n = 6, 386) is considerably reduced
compared to the Bernoulli model (n = 35, 917), thus the prior distribution has a higher influence on the
posterior estimation, as illustrated in these results.
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5 Discussion
This study proposes a Bayesian hierarchical framework to model both the lethality of terrorism and the
frequency of lethal terrorist attacks across the world between 2002 and 2013. The statistical framework
integrates spatial and temporal dependencies through a GMRF whose parameters have been estimated
with R-INLA. The novelty of this study lies in its ability to systematically capture the effects of factors
that explain the lethality of terrorism and the frequency of lethal terrorist attacks worldwide and at
subnational levels. Moreover, the analysis of hot-spots at subnational level provides key insight into
understanding the spatial dynamics of both lethality of terrorism and frequency of terrorist events that
occurred worldwide from 2002 to 2013. In this Section, we highlight the main findings and limitations of
this study, and suggest potential improvement, which could be carried out in future studies.
Most country-level studies did not find significant linear relationship between the number of terrorist
attacks and economic variables (Krueger and Maleckova, 2003; Abadie, 2006; Drakos and Gofas, 2006;
Krueger and Laitin, 2008; Gassebner and Luechinger, 2011). On a local scale, we showed that more
economically developed areas tend to encounter more lethal attacks, which provides support to the
theory advanced by Piazza (2006). The author suggested that more economically developed and literate
societies with high standards of living may exhibit more lucrative targets, and therefore are expected to be
more targeted by terrorist attacks. However, we also showed that terrorist attacks, when they occur, are
less likely to be lethal in more economically developed areas. Despite that more economically developed
areas are more prone to terrorism, they provide better protection to their targets, which reduces the
risk of deadly attack. Therefore, one expect a smaller proportion of lethal attacks in more economically
developed areas, as confirmed by our results.
Similar to most country-level studies (Abadie, 2006; Eubank and Weinberg, 2001; Li, 2005; Schmid,
1992), we found that areas in democratic countries tend to encounter more lethal attacks compared to
those in autocracies. The presence of freedom of speech, movement, and association in democratic coun-
tries might reduce the costs to conduct terrorist activities compared to those in autocratic countries (Li,
2005). In line with country-level (Gassebner and Luechinger, 2011; Kurrild-Klitgaard et al., 2006) and
sub-national (Nemeth et al., 2014) findings, we found that terrorist attacks are more likely to be lethal
in ethnically diverse locations, perhaps due to stronger ethnic tensions (Basuchoudhary and Shughart,
2010). As pointed out in Esteban et al. (2012), one should acknowledge that ethnic diversity is only one
possible measure of ethnic division among others, including ethnic fractionalization and ethnic polariza-
tion. Further analysis using different measures of ethnic division is required in order to assess the role of
ethnic division in its wider sense.
While most country-level studies found significant positive linear relationship between population
density and the number of terrorist attacks (Ross, 1993; Savitch and Ardashev, 2001; Crenshaw, 1981;
Swanstrom, 2002; Coaffee, 2010), we did not find evidence that terrorist attacks are more likely to be lethal
or that lethal attacks are more frequent in densely populated areas. However, the Euclidean distance from
terrorist events to the nearest large city is positively associated with the lethality of terrorist attacks but
negatively associated with the number of lethal attacks. Since targets are usually less secure in small cities
and rural areas, this might facilitate deadly terrorist operations, which is consistent with our findings.
In contrast, large cities offer greater anonymity and recruitment pool, which might open the door for a
high number of lethal attacks.
In addition, more lethal attacks are expected within or close to large cities since they have an impact
on a larger audience, which is often a desired outcome (Laqueur, 1999, p. 41; Crenshaw, 1990, p. 115;
Savitch and Ardashev, 2001). Furthermore, terrorists benefit from high density communication network
(road and rail) in large cities to move freely and rapidly from and to target points (Heyman and Mickolus,
1980 ; Wilkinson, 1979, p. 189). It is also not uncommon that terrorists target communication network
infrastructure, as exemplified by the March 11, 2004 simultaneous attacks on several commuter trains in
Madrid, Spain, which killed 191 people (Los Angeles Times, 2014).
Even though the number of lethal attacks itself does not appear to be associated with altitude, we
found that terrorist attacks, when they occur, tend to be more lethal in higher altitude. Terrorists might
be less constrained by governmental forces during terrorist operations launched in less accessible regions,
such as mountains, which can provide save havens to terrorists (Abadie, 2006; Ross, 1993). Terrorist
groups can therefore benefit from knowledge of “rough” terrain (mountainous regions) to defeat the enemy,
as illustrated by the successful attacks carried out by the Mujahedeen groups against the Soviet Union,
and later, the Taliban against NATO (Buhaug et al., 2009). Therefore, one might reasonably assume
that terrorists increase their killing efficiency in mountains, which is reflected in a higher proportion of
“successful” lethal attacks. However, since human targets are usually more scarce in mountainous regions,
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the advantage of the terrain might not suffice to compensate the lack of targets, which in turn reduces
the number of possible lethal attacks that can be planned and carried out. Nevertheless, complementary
analysis would be required in order to confirm the plausibility of this interpretation of the results.
As with any statistical analyses of complex social phenomena, the outcome of this study should be
taken with caution. First, since we aim to investigate terrorism across the entire world and at high
spatial resolution, the availability of suitable covariates is limited. As a result, our study has ineluctably
omitted numerous relevant drivers of both the lethality of terrorist attacks and their frequency, which
include characteristics (e.g. psychological processes) of each member of terrorist groups, ideology, beliefs,
and cultural factors (Crenshaw, 1983, p. 29; Wilkinson, 1990, p. 151; Brynjar and Skjølberg, 2000;
Richardson, 2006, pp. 92-93), or reciprocal interactions between counterterrorism and terrorism (English,
2010; Hoffman, 2002) for example. Despite the fact that our models do not allow for estimating the
marginal effect of each potential unobserved factor, their aggregated effect has been however taken into
account through the space-time dependence structure represented by the GMRF (ζ˜ in equations (3b) and
(5b)).
Second, one could reasonably expect some spatial variability in the lethality and the frequency of
terrorist attacks, especially within large cities that are regularly targeted by terrorists. However, since
terrorist events from GTD are reported at the centroid of the nearest city in which they occurred, spatial
variability of terrorism’s lethality and frequency within cities cannot be captured. Moreover, we assume
that the spatial correlation in both the lethality of terrorism and the frequency of lethal terrorist attacks
depends only on the distance between the locations of terrorist attacks (stationarity) and is invariant to
rotation (isotropy). This assumption might be too restrictive, since it would be equally reasonable to
assume that the spatial correlation related to mass-casualty attacks extends into a larger spatial range,
via a broader diffusion through media for example. Further studies might investigate the use of non-
stationary models, which are currently being developed for the model class that may be fitted with INLA
(Lindgren et al., 2011).
Third, the temporal unit exhibits limitations as well, since the study period is discretised into 12 years
(2002-2013), even though GTD provides day, month, and year for most events. Access to more computa-
tional power may allow further analysis to investigate variation in a monthly or weekly basis. Moreover,
for computational reasons, we assume no interaction between spatial and temporal dependencies of the
lethality and frequency of terrorist attacks, i.e. separable space-time models, where the covariance struc-
ture can be written as the product of a purely spatial and a purely temporal covariance function for all
space-time locations (Gneiting et al., 2006). In our models, ζ˜ follows a simple autoregressive process
(AR(1)) in time. In non-separable models, the dependencies structure in both space and time is usually
highly complex (Harvill, 2010), and therefore more computationally demanding.
Fourth, subjective choices have been made throughout the entire modelling process, which might affect
both the internal and external validity of our results. A major concern is the absence of consensus on
the definition of terrorism (Beck and Miner, 2013; Jackson, 2016), and subjectivity is therefore inevitable
(Hoffman, 2006, p. 23). In line with English (2010, pp. 24-25), we agree that is all the more important
that studies on terrorism must clearly state how terrorism is understood. Accordingly, we use data from
GTD, which clearly states the definition used to classify acts as terrorist events. Moreover, as with any
Bayesian analysis, our study involves a degree of subjectivity with regard to the choice of priors. Because
of our relatively large dataset, we are confident that the choice of priors does not influence our results,
as confirmed by our prior sensitivity analysis (Section 4). However, subjectivity remains in the definition
of the threshold for hot-spots. We have chosen ones which ensures probability of lethal attacks higher
than non-lethal (Bernoulli) and expected number of lethal attacks that correspond to high percentile
(Poisson). We recommend practitioners and researchers in the field of terrorism to take particular care
in choosing cut-off values, which might vary according to the purpose of their study.
Despite its aforementioned shortcomings, this study suggests a rigorous framework to investigating
the spatial dynamics of the lethality of terrorism and the frequency of lethal terrorist attacks across the
world and on a local scale. It assesses the uncertainty of the predictions, which is crucial for policy-
makers to make informed decisions (Zammit-Mangion et al., 2013, p. 64) or to evaluate the impact of
counterterrorism policies (Perl, 2007) for example. Ultimately, this research may provide complementary
tools to enhance the efficacy of preventive counterterrorism policies.
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Figure 1: Left : Constrained Refined Delaunay Triangulation (mesh) with 9,697 vertices, on the top of
which the SPDE and its discretised solutions (GMRF) are built (Lindgren, 2012). Mate´rn correlation
function (solid line) with parameters λ = 1 and its CI95% (dashed lines) for Bernoulli model with posterior
mean κ ≈ 23.32 (centre) and Poisson model with posterior mean κ ≈ 76.03 (right). Note the differences
in the posterior mean range (vertical dotted line) between Bernoulli (centre) and Poisson models (right),
which corresponds to correlation ≈ 0.1 (horizontal dotted line)
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Figure 5: Estimation of the mean and the 95% credible intervals (line segment) of the posterior distribu-
tion of the parameters: intercept β0, covariates β, and spatial parameters (range r and precision τ of the
GMRF). The estimated values are provided for both the Bernoulli (left) and the Poisson (right) models.
The mean of the posterior distribution of each parameter is illustrated for the default prior models ( )
and the models with the modified priors ( ). The Bernoulli model uses modified priors set as: σ2
ζ˜
= 50
and r = 500 [km], while the Poisson model uses σ2
ζ˜
= 50 and r = 100 [km]. In both the Bernoulli and
Poisson models, the results using the modified priors are consistent with those using the default priors in
both point estimation (mean) and the direction of the effect
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